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Abstract 
Despite the acknowledgement that mental health inequalities are shaped by the interaction of 
macro-level (structural) and micro-level (individual, agentic) powers, dominant paradigms in 
mental health research have been ill-equipped to integrate those different levels of influence 
theoretically and empirically. As a result, an ‘explanatory deficit’ persists as to the causal 
mechanisms underpinning the impact of social inequalities on mental well-being, particularly 
mental health recovery. To redress this gap, critical realism has been put forward as a useful 
metatheoretical alternative. This paper begins by offering a succinct critique of extant mental 
health recovery research. Mental health recovery is problematised in relation to its dynamic 
embeddedness in contextual, including macro-structural, conditions. The core tenets and 
principles of critical realism are then invoked to address the identified philosophical and 
theoretical inadequacies. This paper argues that critical realism offers promise for explaining 
how inequality-generating mechanisms, such as social exclusion, may impede recovery. The 
analytico-conceptual potential of critical realism has remained largely untapped by the extant 
mental health scholarship. Critical realism offers a holistic and inclusive set of conceptual tools 
to re-examine the structure-agency nexus in order to advance mental health recovery and 
inequalities research, and an equity-based policy agenda. 





As health inequalities deepen in many developed nations (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010), 
understanding the impact of social exclusion and other forms of structural disadvantage on 
individuals’ mental well-being has been highlighted as a priority for public health policy and 
research (Morrow & Malcoe, 2017). The accumulating evidence of the association between 
macro-structural factors, such as income inequality, and poor mental health has strengthened the 
mandate to ‘deepen[ing] our understanding of how multiple inequalities are created, 
maintained and reproduced’ (International Social Science Council, the Institute of Development 
Studies, & UNESCO, 2016, p. 31). Arguably, this requires the thoughtful and critical use of 
theories and metatheories that adequately capture the processes (or mechanisms) via which 
inequality-generating ‘forces’ (at the macro-level) ‘trickle down’ to what are seemingly 
intrasubjective and intimate experiences of health, well-being and recovery(Pickett & Wilkinson, 
2010; Tew et al., 2012). From a social justice perspective, it is incumbent on public health 
research to advance the understanding of how adverse socio-structural mechanisms engender and 
perpetuate inequitable life chances and disproportionately poor well-being in marginalised 
groups (Morrow & Malcoe, 2017). Simultaneously, such a research agenda should remain 
humanistic in its value orientation. Specifically, candidate (meta)theories should be consistent 
with the understanding of the person as an active agent with real and inherent motivations, 
beliefs and commitments, which are capable of affecting real change in a manner that is shaped 
by, but not determined by, social relationships and structures (Smith, 2011; Archer, 2003). 
Equipping health inequalities research with the theoretical robustness and inclusivity that match 
the complexity of social phenomena-that is the focus of the current conceptual piece. 
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The Explanatory ‘Deficit’ in Health Inequalities Research: The Case of Personal Recovery 
amidst Structural Disadvantage 
 
While the existence of a set of fundamental causes of health inequalities, such as poverty, has 
been widely acknowledged, uncertainty remains over the causal pathways that mediate the 
effects of macro-structural ‘forces’ upon observable indicators of mental well-being (Dunn, 
2012; Collins et al., 2015). As admitted by Shaw (2004, p. 414): ‘This difficulty of disentangling 
and proving causal links is inherent to the study of social determinants of health, which tend to 
be multifaceted and confounded.’ This explanatory ‘deficit’ has been attributed to the inability of 
dominant research epistemologies and paradigms to capture the complexity and contingencies of 
causal explanations.(Popay et al., 1998; Somerville, 2013). With its preoccupation with the 
identification of an ever-expanding cluster of ‘factors’ and statistical associations, traditional 
positivist (e.g. epidemiological) research has painted a rather fragmented and inadequate picture 
of social causation that has been reduced to speculated law-like relationships between discrete, 
measurable ‘variables’ (Somerville, 2013). As Popay and colleagues (1998) note, traditional 
health inequalities research has largely failed to meaningfully account for, on a theoretical and a 
philosophical levels, the causal contributions of both individual agency and social structure, and 
their dynamic interactions and contextual embeddedness, to health outcomes (e.g. Popay et al., 
1998). 
This paper will contextualise this explanatory ‘deficit’ by critiquing the empirical study of 
mental health recovery (also called ‘personal recovery’ or simply ‘recovery’). According to 
Anthony’s (1993, p. 16) canonical definition, personal recovery reflects ‘[…] a deeply personal, 
unique process of changing one’s attitudes, values, feelings, goals, skills and roles. It is a way of 
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living a satisfying, hopeful, and contributing life even with limitations caused by the illness. 
Recovery involves the development of new meaning and purpose in one’s life as one grows 
beyond the catastrophic effects of mental illness’. Over the last 20 years, mental health recovery 
has gained prominence as an emancipatory and person-centred philosophy of care and a guiding 
mental health policy principle in developed nations such as the U.K., the U.S., Canada and 
Australia (Slade et al., 2008; Farkas, 2007; New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, 2005; 
Department of Health, 2001; Scottish Government, 2012; US Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2006).  
The rise of the recovery movement has taken place against the backdrop of increasing 
health inequalities and inequities in leading developed nations such as the U.K. and the U.S. (e.g. 
Shinn, 2010). In the context of persistent health and social inequalities, an urgent research and 
policy imperative has become understanding how to best support the personal recovery in 
persons facing social exclusion, economic deprivation, and other forms of structural 
disadvantage, including homelessness and severe poverty (UK Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister 2004; US Department of Health and Human Services, 2006). Those policy imperatives 
necessitate the critical (re-)examination of dominant constructions of what recovery is, how it 
can be promoted, and how the person’s social and biographic context shapes their recovery 
‘journey’. The next several sections engage in a critical analysis of some of the conceptual issues 
in the extant mental health recovery literature. It will be argued that, by and large, this body of 
research has failed to generate comprehensive, context-sensitive and mechanistic accounts of 
what enables and impedes recovery in the context of extreme socio-economic disadvantage, 
particularly poverty and homelessness. 
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Adverse socio-structural conditions based on marginalised socio-economic status (e.g. 
poverty), housing status (e.g. homelessness) and other markers of social division (e.g. race, 
gender, ethnicity, disability) have been commonly associated with experiences of social 
exclusion, discrimination and stigmatisation (Morrow & Malcoe, 2017). Those structural 
configurations, in turn, tend to hinder individuals’ practical opportunities for social participation, 
citizenship and positive meaning-making and identity-building, among other crucial enablers of 
recovery (Leamy et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2015; Tew et al., 2012). The empirical literature on 
personal recovery has been criticised by some for neglecting the multifaceted roles of the 
disempowering and exclusionary socio-structural conditions that often impede recovery-
promoting processes (Harper & Speed, 2014; Morrow & Weisser, 2012). A familiar example of 
this costly scholarly bias is the highly influential ‘CHIME’ framework of personal recovery, 
which is the product of a narrative synthesis of research into the experience of mental health 
recovery (Leamy et al., 2011). A close examination of the development of this framework 
reveals the glaring under-representation of research with individuals experiencing poverty, 
structural discrimination (for example, due to minority ethnic status), and other severe forms of 
social marginalisation and structural violence. As a result of this omission, the CHIME 
framework represents a cluster of decontextualised indicators or factors of personal recovery that 
offers little insight into the dynamic and interrelated mechanisms that account for the emergence 
(or non-emergence) of recovery in the context of structural disadvantage. Situating personal 
recovery within individuals’ socio-structural contexts is instrumental in challenging reductionist 
notions that recovery is merely an intrasubjective, atomised faculty of the individual. Instead, 
personal recovery should more adequately be viewed as an emergent capacity borne out of the 
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individual’s interaction with the ‘broader web of social, political and economic contexts’ (Duff, 
2016, p. 62). 
In response to those gaps in the evidence base, Williams and colleagues (2015, p. 23) 
recommend that: ‘Further research exploring the recovery experiences of individuals living with 
intersecting oppressions based on diagnosis, race, gender, sexuality, etc. is an important issue to 
address in future work.’ Similarly, Hopper (2007, p. 871) purports that ‘[…] critical variables 
such as race, gender, and class tend to fade away into unexamined background realities, 
underscoring the defining centrality of psychiatric disabilities in these lives.’ Proponents of 
critical social justice argue that empirical inquiries of mental health recovery should be 
inseparable from the structural analysis of the economic, institutional and political injustices that 
‘recovering’ individuals tend to systematically endure (Morrow & Malcoe, 2017).  
Macro-structural ‘forces’ that may ‘trickle down’ to the level of the individual experience 
of mental health recovery  (for instance, stigmatising societal attitudes, discriminatory housing 
policies or the medicalisation of mental illness), seem to be the manifestation of the rather 
‘invisible’ (in an empirical sense) ‘confluence of governmental, judicial and medical power’ 
(Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999, p. 14; Morrow & Malcoe, 2017). Yet, the effects of those structural 
configurations can be observed in what are often conceptualised as subjective and individualised 
experiences such as a negative self-concept, hopelessness, loss of meaning, self-neglect, 
passivity, dependence, and others (Vandekinderen et al., 2014).  Arguably, with its 
preoccupation with the intrapsychic ‘markers’ of recovery, much of the theorising in the field has 
failed to account for the complex causality behind observable recovery-related outcomes 
(Fullagar & O’Brien, 2014).  
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The underspecification of the complex relationship between social inequalities and 
recovery processes can be attributed to the inadequate integration, philosophically, theoretically 
and methodologically, of the macro-structural and agential influences upon recovery. Noiseux 
and colleagues (2010) attribute this lack of substantive integration of the micro- and macro-
perspectives of recovery to: (a) the inherent complexity of recovery, in that it is comprised of the 
synchronic occurrence of multiple processes (e.g. see the CHIME model; Leamy et al., 2011); 
and (b) the insufficient use of theories and metatheories to account for the multitude of 
influences upon recovery. The call for a more thoughtful and fine-grained application of social 
theory has been echoed by qualitative researchers in disability studies and in inequality studies 
(e.g. Williams, 2003). Noiseux and colleagues (2009) argue that:  ‘The qualitative studies have 
primarily employed research methods aimed principally at describing the phenomenon of 
recovery […] [which] does not provide sufficient clarification of the dynamics of recovery; that 
is, the reciprocal influence of the personal, environmental and organizational conditions that 
characterize the process.’ (p. 4-5). Therefore, the authors advocate the reorientation towards ‘a 
dynamic conception of recovery’ (p. 3)-according to which recovery is neither ‘activated or 
initiated solely by external factors’ (p. 3), nor merely an individualistic (intrapsychic) process 
(Noiseux et al., 2009). 
Researchers and policy-makers should no longer ‘sanitise’ the concept and empirical study 
of recovery by neglecting the socio-structural context of individuals’ lives, especially in the 
landscape of pervasive health and social inequalities. The structure-agency nexus has been both 
undertheorised and underresearched in relation to mental health recovery (Watson, 2012; Clifton 
et al., 2013; Yanos et al., 2007). This paper argues that the majority of empirical research on 
mental health recovery, rooted in the dominant empiricist (positivist and interpretivist) 
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paradigms, has ‘stripped’ recovery of its causal and contextual complexity by neglecting the 
impact of the structural configurations which individuals navigate. An alternative, complexity-
consistent theorising is likely to be critical to explaining how individuals experiencing mental 
health difficulties can modify, challenge or reproduce existing social arrangements to effect more 
positive mental health outcomes (Hammersley, 2002).  
 
Revitalising the Structure-Agency Dialectic in Mental Health Recovery Research: The Offerings 
of Critical Realism 
This paper argues that critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989) offers the inclusive, non-reductionist and 
explanatory theorising about mental health recovery that accounts for the relevant exclusionary 
and other adverse social structures in society, and the inequality-generating mechanisms that 
they exert (Wainwright & Forbes, 2000; Dunn, 2012; Collins et al., 2015). Developed as both an 
antipode of and a mediator between its epistemological rivals (i.e. positivism, realism and 
constructivism), critical realism offers a rich ontological ‘toolbox’ that recognizes the 
independent but interacting causative effects of both macro-level (e.g. social structures) and 
micro-level (e.g. individual agency) entities (Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006; Bergin et al., 2008). 
Critical realism aims to produce ‘[…] in-depth explanations of the ‘causal mechanisms’ and how 
they exert effect and if they have been triggered and under what circumstances they have been 
activated’ (Bergin et al., 2008, citing Sayer, 2000). As such, critical realism is arguably suited 
for generating explanatory accounts of complex, multi-layered and ‘co-determined’ phenomena 
(Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006). 
Despite its potential, critical realism has remained severely underused in mental health and 
inequalities research. The small body of critical realism informed research with people with lived 
9 
 
experience of mental illness has begun to demonstrate the utility of this metatheoretical 
framework for the generation of in-depth, contextualised accounts of how socio-structural 
factors, such as stigmatisation and socio-economic exclusion, impede individuals’ resources and 
capabilities necessary for achieving positive mental well-being (e.g. Tang, 2018; Bonnington & 
Rose, 2014). 
The in-depth discussion of the ontological and epistemological attributes of critical realism 
is beyond the scope of this paper (Such theoretical discussions are available elsewhere, e.g. 
Williams, 2003; Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006; Forbes & Wainwright, 2001). Instead, several of 
the key tenets and principles of critical realism will be invoked to demonstrate its potential for 
addressing important theoretical and methodological inadequacies in mental health recovery 
research.  
Depth Ontology 
A distinctive feature of critical realism is that it re-centres ontology in the scientific pursuit of 
explaining complex social phenomena (Bhaskar, 1989; Sayer, 2000). A variant of scientific 
realism, critical realism acknowledges the existence of a reality that is independent of humans’ 
perceptions and experiences of it, and assumes the impossibility of the direct access to the nature 
of reality by our senses, experiences, knowledge of theories (Bhaskar, 1989; Sayer, 2000). Those 
tenets are premised on the view of the stratified social reality (as opposed to the ‘flat’ ontology 
inherent to positivism and constructivism). The presupposition of a stratified social realm 
categorically challenges attempts to establish a direct link between what things ‘really’ are (in an 
ontological sense) and humans’ ability to perceive them (Bhaskar, 1989). According to what 
Bhaskar (1989) terms ‘depth ontology’, reality is ‘laminated’ into three distinct yet interlinked 
domains: the real (relatively enduring and largely ‘invisible’ structures and causal liabilities), the 
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actual (events that are the result of the activation of a structural liability, which could be either 
experienced and unexperienced) and the empirical (the level of experiences and observations). 
Satisfactory explanatory analyses of social phenomena must encompass all three domains-an 
insurmountable obstacle to traditional empiricist methods (Wainwright & Forbes, 2000).  
 
Nature of Causality and Social Explanation 
According to critical realism, causality is multi-layered and non-probabilistic. Within a depth 
ontology, causality is distinct from the direct, deterministic cause-and-effect relationships seen in 
‘closed’ system (and akin to hypothetico-deductive research paradigms). Instead, causality is 
viewed as contingent, context-dependent and non-deterministic (Sayer, 2000). Critical realism 
subsumes an ‘open systems’ perspective (Bhaskar, 1998), whereby social phenomena are 
dependent on ‘the continuously changing contextual conditions and the evolving properties of 
component within the structure.’ (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 793). To complicate matters 
further, social structures are, by definition, constantly reproduced by the actions of individual 
agents that comprise them, and they also interact with other social structures, which can 
influence whether their generative powers are enacted or not (Archer, 2003; Sayer, 2000). The 
goal of critical realism, therefore, is to identify ‘tendencies of mechanisms to act within a specific 
contextual environment at a specified time.’ (Sayer, 1992, as cited by Wynn & Williams, 2012, 
p. 793). A ‘tendency’ (also called a ‘demi-regularity’) can be defined as the propensity of a given 
generative (or causal) mechanism to give rise to an event, given the presence of contextual 
enablement. 
One of the main implications of this complex, stratified model of causality is that the 
search for causal mechanisms does not cease at the level of the empirical (e.g. the analysis of 
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statistical regularities or of self-report qualitative accounts). Instead, the critical realist analysis 
harnesses abstract modes of theorising (including transfactual or retroductive reasoning; 
Bhaskar, 1989; Danermark, 2002) about the ‘deeper’ layers of the social world-those 
unobservable but relatively enduring and causally efficacious structural configurations. Such 
structural analysis rejects the notion that causal explanation can be reduced to the properties of 
lower-level entities (e.g. as manifested in personal narratives and in statistical regularities; Sayer, 
2000; Danermark, 2002). Thus, critical realism can overcome the explanatory inadequacies of 
traditional empiricist (quantitative and qualitative) mental health and inequalities research 
(Wainwright & Forbes, 2000). 
 
Non-Reductionist Conception of Structure and Agency 
Critical realism postulates that social structures and individual agency are distinct entities with 
independent causal powers (Archer, 2003; Craig & Bigby, 2015). According to the notion of 
emergence, social structures are irreducible to the actions of individual agents. Conversely, 
human agency is never fully determined by structural influences. According to Margaret Archer, 
for instance, individuals possess an inherent capacity to reflect upon the conditions of their 
existence, upon their past actions and upon their commitments, which, through their interactions 
with conducive contextual influences, can lead to human action, including self-change (Archer, 
2003). Importantly, this non-reductionist view of causality allows for entities at both the macro- 
(e.g. social structures, organisations, interventions) and the micro- (e.g. human cognition, 
motivation, ideation and actions) to have analytically separable causal powers (‘double 
inclusiveness’; Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006; Archer, 2003). This conception of the agency-
structure nexus avoids the dangers of neglecting the influence of social structures and thereby 
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succumbing to the neoliberal philosophy of individual ’responsibilisation’ (Harper & Speed, 
2014). Simultaneously, critical realism avoids the underemphasis of individual causal powers, 
particularly with regards to human volition and capacity to reflect, act upon and transform the 
conditions of existence, which would risk supporting the anti-humanistic view that ‘…people 
[are] cultural dopes, passively progressing along a predetermined path.’ (Parsell et al., 2016, p. 
250, citing Houston, 2009; Abel & Frohlich, 2012). A critical realism informed research, 
therefore, is equally focused on exploring ‘the impingements of structure on individual health 
and well-being’ and ‘the tactics devised by individuals to deal with these very impingements.’ 
(Angus & Clark, 2011, p. 3).  
‘Walking the Talk’: Implementing Critical Realism in the Conceptualisation and Empirical 
Analysis of Personal Recovery 
A persistent barrier to popularising critical realism as a viable metatheoretical alternative for 
(mental) health and inequalities research has been its practical application. Specifically, framing 
recovery as a research problem in a critical realism informed study has been attempted by few 
(See Tang (2018) and Kartalova-O’Doherty and Doherty (2011), for two rare examples).  
Here, a succinct example will be offered of a critical realist framing of personal recovery in 
the context of chronic homelessness-inspired by the current author’s own qualitative research 
with homeless populations experiencing mental health difficulties. Homelessness has often been 
characterised as a ‘wicked’ socio-political issue, which tends to co-occur with other forms of 
disadvantage including substance use problems, serious mental illness, poverty, interpersonal 
violence, discrimination, and others (e.g. Somerville, 2013; Shinn, 2010). Homelessness has 
commonly been ascribed ‘complex causality’ that involves both structural and individual causes 
(Fitzpatrick, 2005; Somerville, 2013). Furthermore, the experience of homelessness is in itself 
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multidimensional and can encompass the physical (lack of physical shelter and safety), social 
(lack of a safe base to build social relationships), existential (lack of ontological security and 
meaning in life), and other domains (Somerville, 2013). This makes the study of co-occurring 
homelessness and mental health difficulties an especially fertile arena for critical realist analysis. 
The following illustration of the application of some of the principles and concepts of 
critical realism is non-prescriptive but rather suggestive of the diverse possibilities afforded by 
its rich ontology. A multi-level or ‘laminated’ (Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006) explanation of 
what enables and constrains personal (mental health) recovery in the context of homelessness is 
likely to require the researcher to trace generative mechanisms at several levels-including at the 
individual, interactional, organisational, cultural and structural ‘layers’ of the social realm 
(adapted from Bhaskar and Danermark (2006): 
I. The individual (or micro-) level captures processes that are primarily biological, 
cognitive, psychological or biographical in nature.  
The effects of psychiatric medication on the individual’s alertness and energy levels, which, in 
turn, may affect how the individual engages in valued social activities, are a consequence of 
essentially biological (or physiological) processes. The individual’s inherent faculties of 
reasoning, decision-making and planning-which are instrumental in defining and setting 
recovery-oriented goals- are examples of cognitive and psychological processes. Lastly, the 
individual’s unique constellation of life experiences-such as physical or psychological trauma, 
admission into institutional care, bereavement and other personal losses-is also likely to play a 




Considered in isolation, those individual-level processes reveal little about why the 
phenomenon under scrutiny (in this case, recovery) is enabled or constrained (Somerville, 2013). 
In an open, complex social system, observable outcomes tend to be the result of the complex 
interlacing of multiple causal influences within and across social strata. For instance, productive, 
context-sensitive analytic questions may be: (1) How does living on the streets in a state of 
constant insecurity and vulnerability to violence (i.e. structural and interactional factors) affect 
the individual’s access to psychiatric medication, as well as the individual’s likelihood of 
choosing to consume the medication with its known wanted and unwanted physiological 
effects?; (2) How does the individual’s informed decision not to take psychiatric medication so 
as to maintain their level of vigilance and stamina, which may be adaptive to the individual’s 
safety on the streets, affect their negative symptoms (e.g. intrusive voice-hearing), and, 
consequently, their capabilities of insight, critical thinking and self-directed action?; (3) What 
personal meaning does the individual attribute to the psychological trauma experienced, and how 
does this experience influence how the individual engages with their case worker (i.e. an 
interactional factor)? 
II. The interactional (or dyadic) level refers to the relational processes that emerge out of the 
individual’s interactions and relationships with others.  
Reciprocity, respect, recognition and other emergent properties of human relationships are 
instrumental for enabling individuals to perform personally and socially valued roles, as well as 
to rebuild a positive social identity. Those processes of identity-building and social 
connectedness have been shown to be among the core empirical indicators of personal recovery 
(Leamy et al., 2011). In the context of homelessness, however, those recovery-promoting 
processes are often severely disrupted (e.g. Karadzhov, Yuan, & Bond, 2019). For many, 
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homelessness is a profoundly alienating and dehumanising experience, which can impede the 
individual’s capabilities of maintaining meaningful social relationships. This further motivates 
the multi-level analysis of the conditions under which recovery-promoting affective and other 
relational processes emerge. 
III. At the organisational level, pertinent analytic questions may concern the degree of 
person-centredness and service integration that a homeless services provider has, and its 
impact on clients’ service engagement, well-being and recovery. Service-providers’ 
stigma, as well as the tendency to medicalise the social distress of clients, is an example 
of a meso-level causal influence that may interact with processes occurring at any of the 
other levels to ultimately facilitate or impede recovery. 
IV. Finally, at the cultural and structural levels, macro-social and economic factors and 
processes such as housing availability, social and public health policies, societal attitudes 
towards homelessness and the mentally ill, culturally sanctioned gender relations, 
economic recessions, poverty and austerity may all be significantly implicated in shaping 
individuals’ homelessness pathways as well as their recovery trajectories (Somerville, 
2013). Consistent with critical realism, those macro-level ‘forces’ do not act in a 
deterministic fashion, but instead interact with a range of individual, relational and 
organisations mechanisms to produce (or not) observable effects on individual well-being 
and recovery. 
To identify such plausible macro-level causal entities and their generative mechanisms and 
associated outcomes, the researcher needs to employ higher-order modes of analytic abstraction 
such as abductive and retroductive (or ‘transfactual’) reasoning. Abductive reasoning enhances 
the explanatory remit and utility of the analysis by reinterpreting the data through the lens of 
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existing theory (or theories). Transfactual reasoning, on the other hand, aims to identify the 
essential (or ‘necessary’) conditions, causal structures and powers that make the phenomenon 
possible (Danermark et al., 2002). Because those causal entities exist in the domain of the ‘real’ 
and are therefore ‘intransitive’ and operate independently of our perceptions of them, they cannot 
be identified empirically but only inferred analytically (Danermark et al., 2002). 
Let us take, for instance, an experiential category-such as ‘boredom’-which has 
hypothetically emerged as a major theme from the inductive (bottom-up, experience-near) 
analysis of qualitative interviews with participants who were homeless. Invoking transfactual 
reasoning, the researcher will utilise the inductively derived meaning units as heuristics in the 
process of ‘mining’ the plausible deeper social structures that shape the participants’ reported 
experiences and subjective knowledge. Pertinent analytic questions, then, might be: What does 
the chronic and debilitating boredom that the participants report presuppose?; What in the social 
and politico-economic order makes those experiences possible?; What is it about social relations 
in society that may foster (or disrupt) the participants’ profound experiences of boredom?; Is 
boredom a manifestation of the participants’ ‘mediated knowledge’ of the macro-political 
processes of social exclusion and misrecognition that negatively impact those without a home? 
In its search of causally efficacious configurations and conjunctions between entities across 
different planes of the social, a critical realist analysis seeks to illuminate candidate mediating 
structures, processes and other entities, including contextual contingencies, that could account 
for the outcomes under scrutiny, in the complex open social system (See Archer (2003); Blom & 
Morén, (2011). As eloquently argued by Bhaskar and Danermark (2006), critical realism 
empowers the researcher to think ‘transfactually’ of the mechanisms that co-determine the 
phenomenon of interest, which minimises the risk of epistemological and theoretical 
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reductionism. This analytic stance can therefore open up the possibilities for conceptualising and 
explaining recovery as a necessarily complex, co-determined phenomenon.  
Implications for Public Mental Health, Health Policy, and Health Inequalities Research 
 
Critical realism informed research holds the potential to ‘more cogently mine social inequalities 
as they pertain to mental health’ (Morrow & Malcoe, 2017, p. 47). A critical realist informed 
analysis should seek to explicate the entirety of the phenomenon of recovery without 
succumbing to biological, psychological or sociological reductionism. To achieve this, one needs 
to synergistically examine how ‘contingencies and context’, ‘personal and collective meanings’, 
and ‘material forces’ may be implicated in the recovery process (Pilgrim & McCranie, 2013, p. 
168). As David Pilgrim (2014 p. 9) argues, in order to obtain a ‘complex ontological picture’ of 
mental health related phenomena, one needs to combine a ‘meaning-focused approach’ with an 
analysis of ‘distal and supra-personal’ influences. Crucially, empirical investigations of 
complex, ‘necessarily laminated’ (Bhaskar, 1989) phenomena need to be situated within an 
explicit ontology that allows for an enhanced understanding of the links between structures, 
causal powers and liabilities, contexts and outcomes, across different social strata (Bhaskar, 
1989; Sayer, 2000).  
A critical realism infused research agenda has the potential to generate substantive 
propositions as to how actions on the social determinants of health are likely to enable or 
facilitate processes (intrapsychic, relational, organisational and structural) that are conducive to 
the mental health recovery of persons experiencing multiple, interlocking forms of structural 
disadvantage. Identifying and preventing the ‘…structures and processes that differentially affect 
people's chances to be healthy within a given society….’ are crucial to an equity-focused 
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research and policy agenda (Östlin et al., 2011, p. 2). Research and policy efforts should 
concentrate on removing structural configurations (e.g. institutional, political, ideological, 
organisational) that tend to act as ‘inequality-generating mechanisms’ (Ng & Muntaner, 
2014)which, for instance, can constrain people’s opportunities for citizenship, social inclusion 
and political empowerment, and therefore stifle the opportunities for achieving a productive, 
satisfying and meaningful life, i.e. the pillars of personal recovery (Williams et al., 2015; 
Anthony, 1993). As Manuel (2006, as cited by Norris et al., 2010, p. 196) states, ‘…good public 
policy takes stock of where people are located, where they want to be (the good life), and how 
the good society can build bridges to help them get there.’ 
Comprehensive and critical knowledge of how both structural conditions and individual 
agency are implicated in individuals’ recovery trajectories should underpin public mental health 
interventions. The focus of critical realism on the role oppressive structures (e.g. poverty, 
discrimination, the political economy) on individuals’ capacity for self-determination, autonomy 
and self-fulfilment has an inherent social justice intent (McNeill & Nicholas, 2017). The 
explanatory accounts that critical realists aim to develop, therefore, have the potential to instruct 
ameliorative change (Hammersley, 2002; Houston, 2010; McNeill & Nicholas, 2017). Mental 
health promotion policy and practice should combine endeavours to remove oppressive structural 
configurations with efforts to stimulate ‘structurally transformative’ individual agency (Abel & 
Frohlich, 2012; Rütten & Gelius, 2011). 
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